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Unai Emery

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J

jceverton

Player Valuation: £30m
I've been a big fan of Emery's for a while now but given the events of last night I thought it might be useful to look at his career in a bit more detail. To start the ball rolling here's a good article about him, although it's a couple of years old
https://intacttactic.wordpress.com/2015/01/03/unai-emery/
UNDERRATED MANAGERS: PART 1 – UNAI EMERY
January 3, 2015
Unai Emery
Managerial Information
Lorca Deportiva (2004-2006)
Unai Emery was given the job at Lorca Deportiva after an injury forced him into early retirement while playing for the club. Lorca had a difficult start to the season meaning the manager’s job became available in mid-November. Emery took charge and by the end of the season had taken the club to a playoff place, which they won, resulting in the club’s first promotion to the Spanish Second Division in the clubs history. In that season Unai Emery also knocked Malaga out the Copa Del Rey to take Lorca to the last 16, where they were eliminated by Atletico Madrid. That was the furthest the club ever got in the Copa Del Rey.

The first season in the Segunda Division Unai Emery took them to an astonishing 5th place finish – they were 2nd favourites to get relegated. Emery got offered the Almeria job at the end of the season, which he took. The season after he left Lorca they finished 21st out of 22 and were relegated. The club were founded in 2002 and disbanded in 2012. Unai Emery’s 2 years in charge were their 2 most successful. He finished with a 45% win percentage. Marca voted him as the best coach in the division.

Almeria (2006-2008)
Emery took over Almeria after they finished 6th in the 2005/06 season. First season in charge he got them promoted with a 2nd place finish, despite spending no money and relying on free transfers and loans. Again he was voted best coach in the division by Marca.

Then, in his first season in La Liga (2007/08) he lead them to their all-time highest position of 8th. That season a total of £8.5m was spent on transfers, of which £6.5m were on Negredo (22), Diego Alves (22) and Felipe Melo (24). In 2007/08 he took them to, what was at that time, their joint best Copa Del Rey run – the last 32. He left Almeria after 2 seasons in charge with a win percentage of 46.43% after he was offered the Valencia job.

Valencia (2008-12)
villa-silva-gi.jpg
2008/09
After 4 successful years in management, Valencia gave a 36 year old Unai Emery the chance at a big club. The season before taking over, Valencia won the Copa Del Rey, but with a 10th place finish in the league and failing to get out the Champions League group (finishing bottom even below Rosenborg) a managerial change was needed.

Unai Emery stepped in and had a respectable first season – finshing 6th in the league, reaching the quarter finals of the Copa Del Rey and the last 32 of the UEFA Cup, while again only having limited funds in the transfer market. Before and after the UEFA Cup games, Valencia had an impressive 13-4-6 league record, compared to the 5-4-6 during their UEFA Cup run. Also during this time Valencia had huge debt problems meaning many players weren’t being paid. The decline then rise in form, unsurprisingly, coincided with Valencia not paying them, then managing to secure a loan to cover the wages of the players. It was during this time that Villarreal were knocked out of the UEFA Cup despite looking very impressive in Europe until that point. The financial problems played a huge part in his first season, though signs were positive, especially in the league.

2009/10
As a result of the financial problems, in the 2009/10 season Valencia sold £18.5m worth of players, several being first team players, then only reinvested £4.5m into the team. Emery signed Jeremy Mathieu on a free transfer and Moya for £4.4m. Valencia had an incredible season considering the financial uncertainty and turnover in players – finishing in 3rd (only behind Real Madrid and Barcelona) and reached the Quarter Final of the Europa League (knocked out to eventual winners, Atletico Madrid, on the away goals rule after a 2-2 aggregate draw).



2010/11
The 2010/11 season was quite strange for Valencia in a number of ways. With the financial problems growing by the day, the club was forced to sell their 2 biggest assets – David Villa and David Silva, as well as a few other starters, such as Marchena and Alexis, both joining close rivals. Emery brought in free transfers Feghouli and Ricardo Costa, while spending £23m on Soldado, Tino Costa, Mehmet Topal, Aduriz and Jonas. Valencia had made a ridiculous £50m profit on transfers that window, which suggested a collapse was on the cards. However, Emery managed to steady the ship and again surpass expectations – Valencia finished 3rd in the league with a larger margin between them and 4th from the previous season (9 points). Their first Champions League in 3 years saw them finish 2nd in the group to Man United before being knocked out in the last 16 to Schalke. Valencia were knocked out in the last 16 of the Copa Del Rey to Villarreal. Given the financial difference between them and the top 2, as well as the quality of players they were forced to sell, it was still a hugely impressive season.

2011/12
His final season in charge was in the 2011/12 season. It started very similar to the last with another key player, Juan Mata being sold. Joaquin and Manuel Fernandes were also sold. Unai Emery, as he’d done in every year at Valencia, spent the limited funds available to build a competitive team. Although he spent £29m, the net spend was only £1m and the wages budget allowed was decreased. Victor Ruiz, Piatti, Rami, Dani Parejo, Diego Alves and Barragan were brought in with Canales on loan and Paco Alcacer being promoted to the first team. Valencia again finished 3rd in the league behind Barcelona and Real Madrid, which is the most they could have hoped for. Valencia were knocked out of the Champions League with a 3rd place finish – behind Chelsea (who won it) and Leverkusen, so they were put in the Europa League. Valencia reached the semi-final where they were knocked out to Atletico Madrid (who won it). Valencia also reached the semi-final of the Copa Del Rey where they were knocked out to Barcelona (yes, they also won it). At the end of the year Emery decided to leave having taken Valencia as far as he thought they could go under him.

In summary he took over a financially unstable Valencia side and despite being forced to sell key players each season, he took them from 10th (the season before he took over) up to 6th, then 3rd, 3rd and 3rd. The year after he left Valencia finished 5th. He ended his 4-year spell with a record of 107-58-55 in all competitions (48.64% win percentage) scoring 385 and conceding 262.

Spartak Moscow 2012
After 8 consecutive successful years in Spain, Emery moved to Russia to manage Spartak Moscow. Spartak had just finished 4th in the league. The year Emery took over the competition for the top places grew with Anzhi spending huge amounts on a few big names, as well as Zenit, CSKA and Rubin investing a fair amount. Unai Emery was sacked just over half way into the season with a league record 9-2-6 – 1.71 points per game. The following 13 games Spartak’s league record was 6-4-3 – 1.69 points per game. They eventually finished 4th. On paper the season was unsuccessful but given the lack of time and trust given, it’s hard to tell what Emery could’ve done. They declined after his departure averaging 1.67 points per game in 2013/14, finishing 6th and currently sitting in 6th with 1.63 points per game this season. Spartak were knocked out of the Russian Cup in the last 16 on penalties to Rostov, which was a huge part of Emery’s sacking. Spartak were also knocked out of a tough Champions League group including Barcelona and Benfica.

Russia is a strange league, especially from a managerial perspective. Clubs are strangely inconsistent, transfer fees make little since and owners are generally trigger-happy. I don’t think he made the right choice going there. It was ultimately a failure, though I do think given time he would’ve done a lot better than they have since his sacking. Emery ended his Spartak career with a 46.15% win percentage.

Sevilla 2013-
2013/14
After finishing 9th in 2012/13, Sevilla brought in Unai Emery to get them back up the table and back to where they thought they should be. The season started similar to several at Valencia with a huge turnover of players, including many of Sevilla’s key men – Negrado, Navas, Kondogbia, Medel, Spahic and Luis Alberto as well as 8 others released or sold for a total of £80m. Sevilla invested £30m back into the team with Emery signing Gameiro, Bacca, Vitolo, Iborra, Beto, Carrico and several others. Given the £50m profit, like at Valencia, you’d think a crisis could be on the cards especially as they’d finished 9th. Sevilla finished the 2013/14 season as Europa League Champions and 5th in La Liga. An unbelievable season considering the squad they had, the players they lost and what happened the season before.

2014-
Now, 16 league games into the 2014/15 season, Emery’s Sevilla sit 4th. Valencia, his old club, are the closest opposition and have started the season very well – their new financial backing and a strange link to Benfica is helping them out. Sevilla again made a profit on transfers (£25m) with Moreno, Rakitic and Fazio making up most of the revenue. As repetitive as it sounds, Emery again spent very well, bringing in Krychowiak, Aleix Vidal, Ever Banega, Tremoulinas, Pareja, Mbia and loaning in Denis Suarez, Deulofeu and Iago Aspas
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for a total £18.4m. In the current footballing world with that amount being spent on 1 or 2 players, it’s amazing to see a manager continually finding bargains through thorough scouting and an understanding of what he needs to build team-after-team who can compete with anyone, aside from the elite.

Sevilla are currently in the last 16 of the Copa Del Rey having won their first tie 11-2 on aggregate – they face Granada next. Sevilla unfortunately missed out on Champions League qualification by 1 year. Europa League winners from 2014/15 qualify for the Champions League. Sevilla are now in the last 32 of the Europa where they face Lucien Favre’s Gladbach. Given the quality of the 2 managers, it’s hard to imagine either being stuck in charge of many Europa League ties in a few years.

Summary
Unai Emery hasn’t got a huge collections of trophies like some managers in Europe, but what he does offer that many don’t is his ability to consistently achieve and surpass expectations. The clubs he’s managed haven’t been expected to win trophies, though if you take out the elite, he’s often finished in the next available place (especially at Valencia with three 3rd place finishes in four years – only behind Barcelona and Real Madrid). The style of play, though not as exciting tactically as a Roger Schmidt or Pep Guardiola, is incredibly well thought out and organised. His teams are always flexible, mostly a 4-2-3-1, but there are always tweaks to suit both what he has at his disposal and to take advantage of the opposition. He’s an obsessive perfectionist and I have no doubts that whatever top club gives him his chance in the elite won’t regret it. Success follows him from club-to-club, and that is no coincidence.

Main Achievements 2004-2014
  • Promotion
    Lorca Deportiva – 2004/05 – Segunda División B
  • Promotion
    Almeria – 2006/07 – Segunda División
  • 3 consecutive 3rd place finishes (only behind Barcelona and Real Madrid)
    Valencia – 2009/10, 2010/11 & 2011/12
  • Europa League Winners
    Sevilla – 2013/14
 
Here's a tactical analysis from http://outsideoftheboot.com/2015/07/23/tactical-philosophy-unai-emery/
While this website has made its name focusing on the lesser known youth of this beautiful sport, and combined it with a tinge of tactical flavour meant for the football enthusiast, we found a large gap to be exploited in terms of combining the two. This mini-series thus focuses on young managers (below the age of 45) and their tactical philosophies, deriving what got them here and where they could go. In this piece, Nachiketh Ramesh gives an in-depth insight into the in demand Unai Emery.

Background
Unai Emery’s father, grandfather and uncle were professional football players and it was in Emery’s genes to follow their footsteps. But the journey was not an easy one for the Basque. After representing Real Sociedad five times at the senior level, Emery was booted out. He spent most of his time playing for lower division clubs until an injury put an end to his playing career during his time at Lorca Deportiva.

Lorca Deportiva was the turning point in Emery’s life – the club’s president made Emery the manager of the team. Did the president play the card blindly? Or did he sense the potential in Emery? No one knows. But Emery’s team performed well and gained promotion to the second division and with it started Emery’s ascent to glory. Success at Lorca was followed by spells of over-achievement at Almeria and Valencia. With Almeria, Emery won promotion from Liga Adelante in the first season and guided La Union to eighth place in the first season in the top flight.

Unai-Emery-Sevilla.png


At the Mestalla he achieved 3 consecutive third place finishes in the league even after losing world class players every season. However, as his tenure came to an end Emery had to face unsatisfied fans and a board that needed something more than just a third place finish – a trophy to attest its place amongst those with power, Barcelona and Real Madrid.

After a brief and not-so-good time with Spartak Moscow, Emery returned to Andalusia to manage Sevilla. Sevilla was having a torrid period financially which resulted in poor performances on the field. Sevilla needed him to stabilize the team and Emery had never won a major trophy in his lifetime. A win-win situation for both the parties. Sevilla served as a platform for him to accomplish his dreams and Emery helped the club back to glory.

Tactical Philosophy
Of the four Spanish clubs he has managed so far, none was in a stable condition when Emery took over – some of the clubs were famous but were debt ridden while the others just could not find the money to back their manager. So, Emery had to adjust himself to these constraints and this might be one of the reasons for the pragmatic approach he often adopts. Unai Emery usually favors the 4-2-3-1 formation with a touch of 4-3-3 to it. Great flexibility in the midfield is one of the characteristics of his teams. Ever since his time at Valencia, Emery has been using a somewhat similar formation.



Defending when the ball is in the attacking third: Pressing the goal-keeper


It is noticeable how Sevilla are pressing. The players are positioned such that the opponents (Barcelona here) are compelled to spread out. The two wingers are in narrow positions, occupying the region at the edge of the box – they have pinned back the center backs and forced the wing backs wide. The striker has fallen back to press alongside the central attacking midfielder – they have occupied the two central midfielders. The two deep midfielders are keeping track of the movements of any unmarked players in the central region and the wingbacks as well. They have formed a structure that resembles an “H”.

For the goal-keeper the safest option is to pass to either one of the wing backs. Suppose the ball is played to the right wing back, then the 3 Sevilla players positioned on his side can press and force him to make an error or lose the ball cheaply.

The pressing has stretched the opposition and once the ball is won back, Sevilla can use the space well to play out threatening passes. Also the huge gaps between the opposition players means they can’t counter-press with ease and even if they manage to press, then it will just create free spaces in some other part.

The structures don’t always resemble a set pattern. It depends on the opponents.

Defending when the ball is in the midfield zone: Forming structures that help in quick transition


Sevilla, as the photo depicts, are pressing Messi who is in the deep midfield region. He is being put under pressure by the left-back and the left winger. Now, if either one of them manage to nick the ball from him (they do!) then it poses a serious threat to the opponents (almost scored).

As in the previous case, the midfielders and the forward have formed a structure, only that it is not an “H” shape but an odd hexagon. The ball, if put into the center zone of this structure, makes it easy for Sevilla to win. So Messi’s options are to dribble or to pass back. If passed back to the center back or the right back, then the forwards can impose themselves on the backline to win the ball.

If Messi loses the ball, then the striker, along with the central attacking midfielder and the winger in the far end, can attack the open spaces as either one of the ball winners bring the ball near the box.

Also note the pressing patterns of Sevilla in both the cases. They have a good structure that enables them to have access to the ball. Unlike many other teams who face Barcelona, Sevilla have exploited the spaces properly and pressed. If too many players try to press a player when playing against opponents like Barcelona, it can lead to exposure of defense if the pressing trap isn’t executed properly.

The two players circled in red are the defensive midfielders of the 4-2-3-1. They position themselves in such a manner that they keep enough pressure on the opponents in the central region and don’t open up their defense too much by pushing higher.

Defending against high defensive line and defending the ball in the defensive third: 4-4-2 and conceding the wings


While defending against teams that use a high defensive line, Emery usually deploys a 4-4-2 structure in the defensive third. The central attacking midfielder moves high-up to play as the second striker – forming a partnership with the striker in pressurizing the back-line. The team usually uses a blend of zonal and man marking system – the midfielder players are sought after and marked while the wide players are marked depending on the orientation of the ball.

Here, Sergio Busquets cannot play the ball through the middle – the two central midfielders are marked. He can, however, play it out wide to the wing backs in advanced positions. The orientation of Sevilla is to the left side of the pitch (from their point of view) and hence, have man marked the right winger and right wing back of the opposition (Neymar, on Barcelona’s left wing, is marked only because he has drifted inside).

The other wing back is free with acres of space in front of him and Sevilla are happy to see the opponents play out the ball to the wide regions. Once Busquets sends the ball to the left wing of Barcelona, Sevilla will orient accordingly and the players on the right wing of Barcelona will be relieved.

Attack: Midfield organization


The most interesting aspect of Emery’s game is the three central midfielders. In the Sevilla team of 2014-15, it was Ever Banega who usually started as the central attacking midfielder. Grzegorz Krychowiak and Vincente Iborra played behind him.

As the game unfolds, Banega would fall back into deeper positions to collect and play out the ball. The resulting gap between the opposition’s lines was filled by Iborra. In the defensive phase, Banega offers support for the striker and in drawing out pressing patterns. He allows the team to have more fluidity in the midfield region while attacking and provides a good number of defensive options off the ball.

In this case, Banega has dropped to defensive midfield and has done so in order to have better control over the ball. Had Krychowiak stayed a bit up field, Banega would have stayed amidst the opposition midfielders.

Also Banega’s movement is followed by the left winger Vitolo, who has moved to the space left open by the Argentinian. This has created an overload on the right wing of Sevilla. Sevilla create such overloads to attain numerical advantages on some parts of the pitch. When the opponents switch their focus to the overloaded region, the ball will be moved quickly into free space.

Ivan Rakitic played like a box to box midfielder for Sevilla in his final season at the club. He was instrumental in winning the Europa League. A similar role is played by Banega.

Winning the ball by pressing and quick counter attacks:


When up against superior teams like Barcelona, the technique used by Sevilla is quite intriguing. Rather than playing into the hands of the opponents, they try to make things tough by executing well worked out plans.

Here, Banega is forcing Busquets to play the ball to Iniesta. Barcelona have five players in the half-space region, the same number as Sevilla. Barcelona have superiority in terms have quality and space utilization but they are very much unaware of the trap laid out by Emery’s players.

When the ball is played out to Iniesta (action 1), Sevilla players press and close down the space and cut out Iniesta’s passing options (action 2). As soon as the ball is won, Bacca can run at the defense of the opponents. So can Vitolo. Banega becomes the free man, with space ahead of him, to make use of the ball while the Barcelona defense is made vulnerable.

Sevilla defend by pressing and drawing out patterns that help in quick transition. They attack by either counter attacking from their own half or breaking down the attacking moves of the opponents in the attacking third itself.

Three career defining matches
Almeria 2 – Real Madrid 1:Almeria finished the 2007-08 season of La Liga in the top half of the table. To cap such a wonderful campaign was a sweet victory over Real Madrid in Estadio Mediterraneos. It was a 2-1 win – the winning goal scored by Alvaro Negredo.

Valencia 3 – Sevilla 1: The second leg of the semifinals of Europa League 2013-14 – against Valencia in Mestalla – was the match that set into motion the dreams of Sevilla players, and thousands of fans and it was the goal scored in the fourth minute of the extra-time that instilled the winning spirit in Unai Emery’s team. The goal, scored by Stephane M’bia, put Sevilla in the flight to Turin in place of Emery’s previous club. This match can be considered as the most important, in Sevilla’s back-to-back win of Europa League titles.

Sevilla 2 – Barcelona 2: Most of us will be remembering this match, the match in which Barcelona, led by Luis Enrique, let a two goal cushion slip by and dropped two precious points. The severity of the title race was so much that, Sevilla did not get sufficient credit for their exploits. It was a display of the never-give-up mentality of Emery’s team.

Three key players developed
Unai Emery’s clubs were usually the donors of talented players to the rich clubs and sugar-daddies. So, it was a necessity for him to dig up fresh talents from the youth academies every season. The departure of key players paved the way for the talented youngsters to showcase their potentials. Emery has developed many players, but Juan Mata, Jordi Alba and Ever Banega are the most important ones. Mata, now at Manchester United, won almost everything with Chelsea and was a core part of their Champions League and Europa League winning team. Jordi Alba, another product of Emery’s Valencia, recently won the treble and played a crucial part in Spain’s Euro 2012 victory. Ever Banega, part of Emery’s Valencia squad, was brought last summer and has done a good job in filling Ivan Rakitic’s boots.
 


There are rumours (supposedly in the times) that he has stated his interest in talking to us about the managers position.
 

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